Beyond Philosophy

Unamuno explains that he finds doubt fundamental to the human condition. It is normal for us to doubt, no matter what we happen to believe, or how that belief finds expression in the activity of our life. To be without doubts, he thinks, is to be in some sense inhuman (monstruous, obscene, deformed). La certeza absoluta, completa, de que la muerte es un completo y definitivo e irrevocable anonadamiento de la conciencia personal, una certeza de ello como estamos ciertos de que los tres ángulos de un triángulo valen dos rectos, o la certeza absoluta, completa, de que nuestra conciencia personal se prolonga más allá de la muerte en estas o las otras condiciones, haciendo sobre todo entrar en ello la extraña y adventicia añadidura del premio o del castigo eternos, ambas certezas nos harían igualmente imposible la vida. En un escondrijo, el más recóndito del espíritu, sin saberlo acaso el mismo que cree estar convencido de que con la muerte acaba para siempre su conciencia personal, su memo

Seneca prefers to live at peace with the world and himself, rather than wage war on the world to keep his own peace, or run constantly from conflict with himself, going on endless vacations like Lucilius, who looked for peace in the world when he couldn't find it in his own heart. Cum hac persuasione vivendum est: non sum uni angulo natus, patria mea totus hic mundus est. Quod si liqueret tibi, non admirareris nil adiuvari te regionum varietatibus in quas subinde priorum taedio migras; prima enim quaeque placuisset si omnem tuam crederes. Nunc non peregrinaris sed erras et ageris ac locum ex loco mutas, cum illud quod quaeris, bene vivere, omni loco positum sit. N um quid tam turbidum fieri potest quam forum? ibi quoque licet quiete vivere, si necesse sit. Sed si liceat disponere se, conspectum quoque et viciniam fori procul fugiam; nam ut loca gravia etiam firmissimam valetudinem temptant, ita bonae quoque menti necdum adhuc perfectae et convalescenti sunt aliqua parum salubria.

Here Marcus discusses a problem with goods. Some goods are simply good (virtues like prudence, justice, or courage). Others are not (material possessions and a good public reputation). How do we mark the difference? If something must be praised by others to be good, then it isn't really good, and we should expect too much of it to be, in fact, bad. Material wealth and celebrity, while they seem good to many people most of the time, frequently prove evil in history, depriving their possessors of freedom that our life requires. Ὁποῖά τινά ἐστι τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκοῦντα ἀγαθά, κἂν ἐντεῦθεν λάβοις. εἰ γάρ τις ἐπινοήσειεν ὑπάρχοντά τινα ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθά, οἷον φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, οὐκ ἂν ταῦτα προεπινοήσας ἔτι ἀκοῦσαι δυνηθείη τό· «ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν», οὐ γὰρ ἐφαρμόσει. τὰ δέ γε τοῖς πολλοῖς φαινόμενα ἀγαθὰ προεπινοήσας τις ἐξακούσεται καὶ ῥᾳδίως δέξεται ὡς οἰκείως ἐπιλεγόμενον τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ κωμικοῦ εἰρημένον. οὕτως καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ φαντάζονται τὴν διαφοράν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο μ

Unamuno presents the conflict between our reason, which shows us the limits of mortality, and our desire, which shows us a vital will to live that overwhelms every other will we have. Which of these two faculties will emerge victorious, in the end? We do not know, for their war in us is coterminous with our human existence. The outcome of this, for us, is uncertainty. Nada es seguro; todo está al aire. Y exclama, henchido de pasión, Lamennais ( Essai sur l’indifférence en matière de religion , IIIe partie, chap. 67): «¡Y qué! ¿Iremos a hundirnos, perdida toda esperanza y a ojos ciegas en las mudas honduras de un escepticismo universal? ¿Dudaremos si pensamos, si sentimos, si somos? No nos lo deja la naturaleza; oblíganos a creer hasta cuando nuestra razón no está convencida. La certeza absoluta y la duda absoluta nos están igualmente vedadas. Flotamos en un medio vago entre estos dos extremos, como entre el ser y la nada, porque el escepticismo completo sería la extinción de la intelig

Seneca tells Lucilius how to live, and travel, well: we must quiet the mind, allowing it to release the burden of attachment ( addicere, cf. addiction) that makes particular events painful to us. When we release this burden, all places become home to us, because we are at home in our minds, free to be here without worrying about what is there , and vice versa . Vadis huc illuc ut excutias insidens pondus quod ipsa iactatione incommodius fit, sicut in navi onera immota minus urgent, inaequaliter convoluta citius eam partem in quam incubuere demergunt. Quidquid facis, contra te facis et motu ipso noces tibi; aegrum enim concutis. At cum istuc exemeris malum, omnis mutatio loci iucunda fiet; in ultimas expellaris terras licebit, in quolibet barbariae angulo colloceris, hospitalis tibi illa qualiscumque sedes erit. Magis quis veneris quam quo interest, et ideo nulli loco addicere debemus animum. Cum hac persuasione vivendum est: non sum uni angulo natus, patria mea totus hic mundus es

Marcus reflects on the way different actions demand a different affect from us. Each action I engage molds the inner form of myself to fit whatever I find most congenial to it. I can express myself as many different things, depending on what actions I choose, and how I choose to engage them. Πρὸς τί ποτε ἄρα νῦν χρῶμαι τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ ψυχῇ; παρ’ ἕκαστα τοῦτο ἐπανερωτᾶν ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐξετάζειν τί μοί ἐστι νῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μορίῳ, ὃ δὴ ἡγεμονικὸν καλοῦσι, καὶ τίνος ἄρα νῦν ἔχω ψυχήν; μήτι παιδίου; μήτι μειρακίου; μήτι γυναικαρίου; μήτι τυράννου; μήτι κτήνους; μήτι θηρίου; What is the work to which I dedicate my soul, right now? In every task it becomes my duty to ask myself a recurring question, searching the depths of my inner life: what sort of being do I hold right now in the seat of power that rules my mind? What kind of life or soul do I possess in this moment? The soul of a child, perhaps? Of a youth? A little girl? A tyrant? An ox? A predator in the wild?

Unamuno presents his position squarely. On the one hand, it would be irrational to say that our individual souls are immortal. On the other, it would be insincere if he denied his feeling that they are, a feeling that he has in spite of all reason. For we do not live by reason alone. No faltará a todo esto quien diga que la vida debe someterse a la razón, a lo que contestaremos que nadie debe lo que no puede, y la vida no puede someterse a la razón. «Debe, luego puede», replicará algún kantiano. Y le contrarreplicaremos: «no puede, luego no debe.» Y no lo puede porque el fin de la vida es vivir y no lo es comprender. Ni ha faltado quien haya hablado del deber religioso de resignarse a la mortalidad. Es ya el colmo de la aberración y de la insinceridad. Y a esto de la sinceridad vendrá alguien oponiéndonos la veracidad. Sea, mas ambas cosas pueden muy bien conciliarse. La veracidad, el respeto a lo que creo ser lo racional, lo que lógicamente llamamos verdad, me mueve a afirmar una cosa

Seneca answers a letter from Lucilius in which the latter asked why his vacations abroad failed to improve his life, philosophically speaking. Seneca points out that changing location is not the same as changing our internal condition. We cannot control the weather outside, but the weather in our minds is something over which we have significant control, if we can learn to grasp it. Hoc tibi soli putas accidisse et admiraris quasi rem novam quod peregrinatione tam longa et tot locorum varietatibus non discussisti tristitiam gravitatemque mentis? Animum debes mutare, non caelum. Licet vastum traieceris mare, licet, ut ait Vergilius noster,        terraeque urbesque recedant, sequentur te quocumque perveneris vitia. Hoc idem querenti cuidam Socrates ait, 'quid miraris nihil tibi peregrinationes prodesse, cum te circumferas? premit te eadem causa quae expulit'. Quid terrarum iuvare novitas potest? quid cognitio urbium aut locorum? in irritum cedit ista iactatio. Quaeris quare te f

Marcus meditates on the futility of human knowledge: even when we are very well informed, life shows us important events over which we lack final control. While these events don't always look the same today as in antiquity, we still see them (in similar places, even: battlefields, markets, matters of love, all the things Seneca would put within the realm of fortune). How do we handle this lack? Marcus recommends pious resignation, where others have chosen to rebel and fight harder. Why? Τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐν τοιαύτῃ τρόπον τινὰ ἐγκαλύψει ἐστίν, ὥστε φιλοσόφοις οὐκ ὀλίγοις οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν ἔδοξε παντάπασιν ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι, πλὴν αὐτοῖς γε τοῖς Στωικοῖς δυσκατάληπτα δοκεῖ· καὶ πᾶσα ἡ ἡμετέρα συγκατάθεσις μεταπτώτη· ποῦ γὰρ ὁ ἀμετάπτωτος; μέτιθι τοίνυν ἐπ’ αὐτὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα ὡς ὀλιγοχρόνια καὶ εὐτελῆ καὶ δυνάμενα ἐν κτήσει κιναίδου ἢ πόρνης ἢ λῃστοῦ εἶναι. μετὰ τοῦτο ἔπιθι ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν συμβιούντων ἤθη, ὧν μόλις ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ χαριεστάτου ἀνασχέσθαι, ἵνα μὴ λέγω, ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτόν τις μόγις ὑπ

Unamuno returns to his assessment of reason as fundamentally morbid : it imposes limits upon us, which in biology we call mortality. Against it lies everything that we might call our will to live, a longing for immortality that Unamuno makes an essential, and irrational, feature of religion. La consecuencia vital del racionalismo sería el suicidio. Lo dice muy bien Kierkegaard: «El suicidi o es la consecuencia de existencia del pensamiento puro ... No elogiamos el suicidio, pero sí la pasión. El pensador, por el contrario, es un curioso animal, que es muy inteligente a ciertos ratos del día, pero que, por lo demás, nada tiene de común con el hombre». ( Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift , cap. 3, § 1). Como el pensador no deja, a pesar de todo, de ser hombre, pone la razón al servicio de la vida, sépalo o no. La vida engaña a la razón; y ésta a aquélla. La filosofía escolástico-aristotélica, al servicio de la vida, fraguó un sistema teleológico-evolucionista de metafísica, al par

Seneca concludes his twenty-seventh epistle with a little quote from Epicurus. Like other such quotes, this one is imagined as a bit of money used to pay a fictitious debt to his friend Lucilius. The meaning of this quote: nature's wealth looks poor to us, who generally value our own pleasure too much—so much that we fail to notice how unpleasant it becomes when we overindulge or become envious of others' indulgence. If we keep a proper perspective, one that is grateful and even happy for survival with minimal health and safety, then we fare better (in soul and body). Sed accipe iam quod debeo et vale. Divitiae sunt ad legem naturae composita paupertas. Hoc saepe dicit Epicurus aliter atque aliter, sed numquam nimis dicitur quod num quam satis discitur; quisbusdam remedia monstranda, quibusdam inculcanda sunt. Vale. But enough already! Take what you're owed, and be on your way. “By nature's law, wealth is just poverty done right, in good order.” Epicurus offers this j

Marcus exhorts himself to remain committed to good action, even when he does not find easy success. This, for him, is philosophy: once you become convicted or convinced of any action's worth, don't give it up merely because it gets hard. The best pleasure comes from persisting in good deeds. Μὴ σικχαίνειν μηδὲ ἀπαυδᾶν μηδὲ ἀποδυσπετεῖν, εἰ μὴ καταπυκνοῦταί σοι τὸ ἀπὸ δογμάτων ὀρθῶν ἕκαστα πράσσειν, ἀλλὰ ἐκκρουσθέντα πάλιν ἐπανιέναι καὶ ἀσμενίζειν, εἰ τὰ πλείω ἀνθρωπικώτερα, καὶ φιλεῖν τοῦτο, ἐφ’ ὃ ἐπανέρχῃ, καὶ μὴ ὡς πρὸς παιδαγωγὸν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπανιέναι, ἀλλ’ ὡς οἱ ὀφθαλμιῶντες πρὸς τὸ σπογγάριον καὶ τὸ ᾠόν, ὡς ἄλλος πρὸς κατάπλασμα, ὡς πρὸς καταιόνησιν. οὕτως γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐπιδείξῃ τὸ πειθαρχεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ προσαναπαύσῃ αὐτῷ. μέμνησο δὲ ὅτι φιλοσοφία μόνα, ἃ θέλει ἡ φύσις σου, θέλει· σὺ δὲ ἄλλο ἤθελες οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. τί γὰρ τούτων προσηνέστερον; ἡ γὰρ ἡδονὴ οὐχὶ διὰ τοῦτο σφάλλει; ἀλλὰ θέασαι, εἰ προσηνέστερον μεγαλοψυχία, ἐλευθερία, ἁπλότης, εὐγνωμοσύνη, ὁσιότης. αὐτῆς γὰρ φ

Unamuno conceives our life as a battle between the heart, which longs to live without dying, and the head, which calculates that this is impossible. In his reading of history, we go through periods of vitalism, when our irrational will to survive forever manifests in worship without great attachment to material forms, and periods of rationalism, when material forms become the most significant culture we possess, because we accept reason and reject immortality. Attempts to harmonize will and reason here must fail, he thinks, as any harmony we achieve turns with time into one of them claiming victory that the other then rises to deny. El instinto de conocer y el de vivir, o más bien de sobrevivir, entran en lucha. El Dr. E. Mach, en su obra sobre El análisis de las sensaciones y la relación de lo físico a lo psíquico ( Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältniss des Physischen zum Psychischen ), nos dice en una nota (I, § 12), que también el investigador, el sabio, der Forscher ,

Seneca explains to Lucilius the difference between mastering something yourself (philosophy), and getting others to correct mistakes you never fix (the approach to literature taken by Calvisius Sabinus). Having a team of fact- and grammar-checkers does not make Sabinus either learned or wise, anymore than keeping a stable of wrestlers would make him strong. If you want strength or erudition as part of your life, then you must personally embrace the discipline of wrestling and studying for yourself, taking your own lessons as best you can. You won't be the greatest, perhaps, but you will have real experience, ability, and respect, rather than annoy everyone like Sabinus. When Seneca says that a good mind cannot be lent or bought, he means that you cannot acquire someone else's mind. Even if they lend it to you, or you pay for it, it will never be yours. Bad minds can be purchased because whenever we buy another's mind, what we get is not good in the way our own experience w