Uncertainty. Unamuno, Life 6.12

Unamuno presents the conflict between our reason, which shows us the limits of mortality, and our desire, which shows us a vital will to live that overwhelms every other will we have. Which of these two faculties will emerge victorious, in the end? We do not know, for their war in us is coterminous with our human existence. The outcome of this, for us, is uncertainty.


Nada es seguro; todo está al aire. Y exclama, henchido de pasión, Lamennais (Essai sur l’indifférence en matière de religion, IIIe partie, chap. 67): «¡Y qué! ¿Iremos a hundirnos, perdida toda esperanza y a ojos ciegas en las mudas honduras de un escepticismo universal? ¿Dudaremos si pensamos, si sentimos, si somos? No nos lo deja la naturaleza; oblíganos a creer hasta cuando nuestra razón no está convencida. La certeza absoluta y la duda absoluta nos están igualmente vedadas. Flotamos en un medio vago entre estos dos extremos, como entre el ser y la nada, porque el escepticismo completo sería la extinción de la inteligencia y la muerte total del hombre. Pero no le es dado anonadarse; hay en él algo que resiste invenciblemente a la destrucción, yo no sé qué fe vital, indomable hasta para su voluntad misma. Quiéralo o no, es menester que crea, porque tiene que obrar, porque tiene que conservarse. Su razón, si no escuchase más que a ella, enseñándole a dudar de todo y de sí misma, le reduciría a un estado de inacción absoluta; perecería aun antes de haberse podido probar a sí mismo que existe.»

No es, en rigor, que la razón nos lleve al escepticismo absoluto, ¡no! La razón no me lleva ni puede llevarme a dudar de que exista; adonde la razón me lleva es al escepticismo vital; mejor aún, a la negación vital; no ya a dudar, sino a negar que mi conciencia sobreviva a mi muerte. El escepticismo vital viene del choque entre la razón y el deseo. Y de este choque, de este abrazo entre la desesperación y el escepticismo, nace la santa, la dulce, la salvadora incertidumbre, nuestro supremo consuelo.


Nothing is certain; anything can happen. Here we run into the passionate exclamation of Lamennais: “What then? Shall we go to wrack and ruin, abandoning all hope to plunge blindly into the silent depths of universal skepticism? Shall we doubt our thoughts, our feelings, our existence? Nature does not allow us this luxury. She forces our belief, even when our reason is not convinced. Absolute certainty and total doubt are equally forbidden to us here. We float on a foundering tide between these two extremes, between being and nothingness, for perfect skepticism would mean the extinction of intelligence and the total death of mankind. But nature does not grant us power to unthing ourselves. Each of us holds within something inexorable that resists destruction, a vital faith that cannot be named or tamed, not even by our will. Whether we want to believe in this faith or not is irrelevant: we must believe, for it must act in us, must keep itself intact using us to that end. Reason, if we listen to her alone, would teach us to doubt everything, including ourselves: we would perish before proving to ourselves the reality of our own existence” (Essay on Indifference 3.67).

In rigorous terms, it is not reason that carries us to total skepticism. Nay! Reason cannot bring me to doubt my own existence by herself. She can take me only as far as doubting my commitment to life; better yet, she carries me to denial. Under her tutelage, I learn not so much to doubt my consciousness as to deny that it might survive death. When reason clashes with desire, then I discover doubts about my commitment to life. As reason and desire come to grips, each is transformed by the other's embrace: desire becomes hopelessness; reason turns to disbelief. From this awful alchemy is born uncertainty, that sweet and holy child, our last comfort and saving grace.