Beyond Philosophy

Nature made us to live with little, Seneca contends. Our lives should thus incorporate experiences that teach us to remain poor, and content with poverty. The poverty he has in mind is not material deprivation per se: it includes adequate food, shelter, and society, but no gratuitous ostentation. Babies offer us good examples of real happiness by being content with milk and clean diapers. Ceterum magnae indolis est ad ista non properare tamquam meliora, sed praeparari tamquam ad facilia. Et sunt, Lucili, facilia; cum vero multum ante meditatus accesseris, iucunda quoque; inest enim illis, sine qua nihil est iucundum, securitas. Necessarium ergo iudico id quod tibi scripsi magnos viros saepe fecisse, aliquos dies interponere quibus nos imaginaria paupertate exerceamus ad veram; quod eo magis faciendum est quod deliciis permaduimus et omnia dura ac difficilia iudicamus. Potius excitandus e somno et vellicandus est animus admonendusque naturam nobis minimum constituisse. Nemo nascitur div

Nature requires our participation. When we cut ourselves off from her, we lose life. Being attached to her necessarily means that we must learn to bear with the hard truths she carries, as well as the easy. In order to have viable crops, families, and communities, we must be prepared to suffer as well as enjoy, to cooperate with others and to look after ourselves. We cannot choose escape from all consequence. That choice is not given to mortals. Εἰ ξένος κόσμου ὁ μὴ γνωρίζων τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντα, οὐχ ἧττον ξένος καὶ ὁ μὴ γνωρίζων τὰ γινόμενα. φυγὰς ὁ φεύγων τὸν πολιτικὸν λόγον· τυφλὸς ὁ καταμύων τῷ νοερῷ ὄμματι· πτωχὸς ὁ ἐνδεὴς ἑτέρου καὶ μὴ πάντα ἔχων παῤ ἑαυτοῦ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον χρήσιμα· ἀπόστημα κόσμου ὁ ἀφιστάμενος καὶ χωρίζων ἑαυτὸν τοῦ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως λόγου διὰ τοῦ δυσαρεστεῖν τοῖς συμβαίνουσιν· ἐκείνη γὰρ φέρει τοῦτο, ἣ καὶ σὲ ἤνεγκεν· ἀπόσχισμα πόλεως ὁ τὴν ἰδίαν ψυχὴν τῆς τῶν λογικῶν ἀποσχίζων, μιᾶς οὔσης. If ignorance of what exists in the world makes us strangers to it, ignorance

Unamuno offers a rational critique of arguments attempting to separate the soul from matter, specifically the human body of flesh and bone that makes our personal thought possible. Es lo corriente que en los libros de psicología espiritualista, al tratarse de la existencia del alma como sustancia simple y separable del cuerpo, se empiece con una fórmula por este estilo: Hay en mí un principio que piensa, quiere y siente ... Lo cual implica una petición de principio. Porque no es una verdad inmediata, ni mucho menos, el que haya en mí tal principio; la verdad inmediata es que pienso, quiero y siento yo. Y yo, el yo que piensa, quiere y siente, es inmediatamente mi cuerpo vivo con los estados de conciencia que soporta. Es mi cuerpo vivo el que piensa, quiere y siente. ¿Cómo? Como sea. Y pasan luego a querer fijar la sustancialidad del alma, hipostasiando los estados de conciencia, y empiezan porque esa sustancia tiene que ser simple, es decir, por oponer, al modo del dualismo cartesiano,