Beyond Philosophy

Marcus here appreciates the value of separating actions from emotions. Today as anciently, combat sports offer an excellent way to train this skill. Few things in life are more practical than learning to fight without losing your cool, especially when you lose. Ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις καὶ ὄνυξι κατέδρυψέ τις καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ ἐρραγεὶς πληγὴν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’ οὔτε ἐπισημαινόμεθα οὔτε προσκόπτομεν οὔτε ὑφορώμεθα ὕστερον ὡς ἐπίβουλον· καίτοι φυλαττόμεθα, οὐ μέντοι ὡς ἐχθρὸν οὐδὲ μεθ’ ὑποψίας, ἀλλ’ ἐκκλίσεως εὐμενοῦς. τοιοῦτόν τι γινέσθω καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς μέρεσι τοῦ βίου· πολλὰ παρενθυμώμεθα τῶν οἷον προσγυμναζομένων. ἔξεστι γάρ, ὡς ἔφην, ἐκκλίνειν καὶ μήτε ὑποπτεύειν μήτε ἀπέχθεσθαι. Someone lays us out in the gymnasium, drops a wild beating on our head, but we don't make a big deal of this, taking offense or suspecting that his deranged attack is an indication of deliberate malice. Though we defend ourselves, our defense isn't offered with spite, as to a foe, but with deference, as among

God, for Unamuno, is not a matter for explanation. Not a means to material ends. Not a locus of human control to be sought in the realm of the physical universe. Knowledge of divinity is not power in the way that knowledge of gravity is. Recognizing gravity better, with greater precision, does not make divinity less or worse or worthless to us. Era yo un mozo que empezaba a inquietarme de estos eternos problemas, cuando en cierto libro, de cuyo autor no quiero acordarme, leí esto: «Dios es una gran equis sobre la barrera última de los conocimientos humanos; a medida que la ciencia avanza, la barrera se retira». Y escribí al margen: «De la barrera acá, todo se explica sin Él; de la barrera allá, ni con Él ni sin Él; Dios, por lo tanto, sobra». Y en respecto al Dios-Idea, al de las pruebas, sigo en la misma sentencia. Atribúyese a Laplace la frase de que no había necesitado de la hipótesis de Dios para construir su sistema del origen del Universo, y así es muy cierto. La idea de Dios en

Seneca continues defending careful, slow rhetoric as proper for philosophy. If you must have bad discursive style, he says, pick a bad style that doesn't commit you to speaking too fast. Recte ergo facies si non audieris istos qui quantum dicant, non quemadmodum quaerunt, et ipse malueris, si necesse est, vel P. Vinicium dicere qui itaque (†). Cum quaereretur quomodo P. Vinicius diceret, Asellius ait tractim. Nam Geminus Varius ait, quomodo istum disertum dicatis nescio: tria verba non potest iungere. Quidni malis tu sic dicere quomodo Vinicius? Aliquis tam insulsus intervenerit quam qui illi singula verba vellenti, tamquam dictaret, non diceret, ait dic, numquam dicas? Nam Q. Hateri (‡) cursum, suis temporibus oratoris celeberrimi, longe abesse ab homine sano volo: numquam dubitavit, numquam intermisit; semel incipiebat, semel desinebat. You will do well to ignore those who attend only the quantity of their discourse, and not its quality. If needs must, you would even prefer t

Generalizing from the particular works better when we know more particulars: my acquaintance with humanity should be extensive enough to suggest things for me to learn that I don't discover on my own, so that I express & become more than just my most narrow imagination of myself. Μή, εἴ τι αὐτῷ σοὶ δυσκαταπόνητον, τοῦτο ἀνθρώπῳ ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνειν, ἀλλ’ εἴ τι ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατὸν καὶ οἰκεῖον, τοῦτο καὶ σεαυτῷ ἐφικτὸν νομίζειν. Don't suppose that something is impossible for mankind just because it is hard for you. Instead, think that you too must be able to grasp a thing commonly possible for other people.

Unamuno does not believe that we can prove the existence of God. What we prove are rational ideas, and these are never sufficient to contain divinity. Y de este Dios surgido así en la conciencia humana a partir del sentimiento de divinidad, apoderóse luego la razón, esto es, la filosofía, y tendió a definirlo, a convertirlo en idea. Porque definir algo es idealizarlo, para lo cual hay que prescindir de su elemento inconmensurable o irracional, de su fondo vital. Y el Dios sentido, la divinidad sentida como persona y conciencia única fuera de nosotros, aunque envolviéndonos y sosteniéndonos, se convirtió en la idea de Dios. El Dios lógico, racional, el ens summum , el primum movens , el Ser Supremo de la filosofía teológica, aquel a que se llega por los tres famosos caminos de negación, eminencia y causalidad, viae negationis, eminentiae, causalitatis , no es más que una idea de Dios, algo muerto. Las tradicionales y tantas veces debatidas pruebas de su existencia no son, en el fondo

Seneca continues explaining good philosophical rhetoric to Lucilius. You want to speak fluently, he thinks, without undue hesitation, but not so quickly that you lose your audience, or sacrifice the ability to catch yourself mid-sentence, should you meet with something that requires reframing. He draws here on experience with Roman courts, where orators played the role of advocates to the judicial magistrate. Philosophers speak as advocates to the court of their listeners, he hints, some of whom are like a brand-new magistrate, unused to hearing cases argued and liable to miss something important, especially if the advocates get too passionate and cease to be cogent. Sed ut pleraque quae fieri posse non crederes cognovisse satis est, ita istos qui verba exercuerunt abunde est semel audisse. Quid enim quis discere, quid imitari velit? quid de eorum animo iudicet quorum oratio perturbata et immissa est nec potest reprimi? Quemadmodum per proclive currentium non ubi visum est gradus sisti

Marcus reflects on the desire for celebrity that he discovers among many contemporary Romans, and finds it rather absurd. If we court too assiduously the thanks and praise of people we never meet, we are apt to forget that real human relationships are only possible with those whose presence we share. Οἷόν ἐστιν ὃ ποιοῦσι. τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χρόνου καὶ μεθ’ ἑαυτῶν ζῶντας ἀνθρώπους εὐφημεῖν οὐ θέλουσιν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν μεταγενεστέρων εὐφημηθῆναι, οὓς οὔτε εἶδόν ποτε οὔτε ὄψονται, περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦνται. τοῦτο δὲ ἐγγύς ἐστι τῷ λυπηθῆναι ἄν, ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ οἱ προγενέστεροι περὶ σοῦ λόγους εὐφήμους ἐποιοῦντο. This is the sort of thing people do: they do not want praise from those who live with them, sharing the same moment in time & space. Instead, they make much of being praised by future generations, whom they have never seen and will never see. This is very near to being grieved because past generations never dedicated speeches of praise to you.

Unamuno continues to sketch the historical apprehension of divinity that culminates in Christian monotheism. Ancient gods are immortal humanoid figures whose society produces kings like Zeus or Jupiter or Yahweh, divine monarchs whose most immediate presence among humans occurs in battle-camps ruled by commanders with authority that no mere individual can bear. The Roman consul, the Greek strategos, the Israelite judge or king: each bears militant authority too great to be simply human. Over time, spokespersons ( prophets , from the Greek προφήτης) for the divinity felt here create an expectation or apprehension that extends the war-god's power beyond the battle-camp into every corner of the world, with personal apprehension and adjustment that the original conception did not have. In time, God appears: a personification of all divinity in one personage, with attention for each and every individual, in all walks of life and every conceivable moment of existence. Believers (like Una

Cynic philosophers and others would occasionally deliver public harangues aimed at critiquing and perhaps bettering the immediate expression of political & social morality in their vicinity. Seneca does not see this kind of discourse as particularly helpful; it happens too quickly to be useful, he thinks, causing people to focus on words instead of behavior, which is the really significant thing. A really useful discourse is one you carry inside for days, months, even years, pondering & assimilating it into your behavior so that you become a more thoughtful agent. This, for Seneca, is philosophy. Slow learning, with the long-term goal of expressing your conscious ideals through deliberate action. Adice nunc quod quae veritati operam dat oratio incomposita esse debet et simplex: haec popularis nihil habet veri. Movere vult turbam et inconsultas aures impetu rapere, tractandam se non praebet, aufertur: quomodo autem regere potest quae regi non potest? Quid quod haec oratio quae s

Marcus Aurelius notices here the difference between the natural world, where material elements move regularly in rhythms we still call cycles (cf. the water cycle), and the smaller human world, where our personal virtue must choose a path only we can find, reading signs meaningful to us that relate our agency to occult powers close by (the gods). No amount of change in the climate, or natural world, will make it possible for all of us to choose the same death. Even if we all come to our death in the same moment, by the same material catastrophe, our souls will encounter it differently, with genius that remains unique to each individual. Ἄνω, κάτω, κύκλῳ φοραὶ τῶν στοιχείων, ἡ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς κίνησις ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τούτων, ἀλλὰ θειότερόν τι καὶ ὁδῷ δυσεπινοήτῳ προιοῦσα εὐοδεῖ. Natural cycles carry the elements up and down, ever in circles, but the movement of virtue is nowhere on this track. It makes headway by divine inspiration, on a path very hard for our minds to grasp.

Unamuno describes his understanding of our historical conception of divinity. On his reading, we (or our ancestors) feel dependent on the environment for important things that we cannot perfectly control. These things come to us mediated by foreign power or agency (notably the weather) that we cannot bind or separate cleanly from ourselves (cf. circadian rhythms, menstrual cycles, digestion, mortality). Feeling our inner and outer lives bound in the expression of this power, we attribute personality like ours to it, and so in time it becomes a traditional divinity: human personality attached to cosmic events larger & subtler than any human can drive, with impact at once objective (sunlight) and subjective (my feeling as I stand in the sun, which I might love or hate, bless or curse). La doctrina de Schleiermacher que pone el origen, o más bien la esencia del sentimiento religioso, en el inmediato y sencillo sentimiento de dependencia, parece ser la explicación más profunda y exacta

Lucilius wrote to Seneca about an experience he had listening to a philosopher named Serapio, whom I do not recognize from other ancient lore. Seneca disapproves of Serapio's rhetorical delivery, as his friend describes it, and uses this occasion to talk about proper philosophical rhetoric, which he thinks should be uttered naturally, with a pace that is neither as fast and forceful as Serapio's, nor again as sluggish as that of someone with the exact opposite approach. If we are to learn from someone who speaks, then the speech should be measured—quick enough to get and keep interest, but not so quick as to overwhelm our ability to make sense of it. A speech too slow will fail to show us what the speaker actually thinks, as our minds will use the last word uttered to anticipate something that becomes our own rendition of whatever we think is being said. When we look back on this speech, we remember our efforts to make sense of it rather than the speech itself, which flies over