Beyond Philosophy

Tradition offers an index of good questions, not answers. The proper purpose of philosophy is not to eliminate your doubt or ennui, but to help you direct it well, toward quests that will yield good meaning & enrich the life you share with others. Ceterum quod libros meos tibi mitti desideras, non magis ideo me disertum puto quam formosum putarem si imaginem meam peteres. Indulgentiae scio istud esse, non iudicii; et si modo iudicii est, indulgentia tibi imposuit. Sed qualescumque sunt, tu illos sic lege tamquam verum quaeram adhuc, non sciam, et contumaciter quaeram. Non enim me cuiquam emancipavi, nullius nomen fero; multum magnorum virorum iudicio credo, aliquid et meo vindico. Nam illi quoque non inventa sed quaerenda nobis reliquerunt, et invenissent forsitan necessaria nisi et supervacua quaesissent. Multum illis temporis verborum cavillatio eripuit, captiosae disputationes quae acumen irritum exercent. Nectimus nodos et ambiguam significationem verbis illigamus ac deinde dis...

Is work bad? Not if it is natural, according to Marcus Aurelius. Hard work is good, too, under the same condition. We must work hard at the tasks that nature gives us, not unnatural tasks that we invent for ourselves. Trying to escape all hard work is ultimately impossible, and the attempt will not do us good. Instead, we want to work, and work hard, at the right things. Οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ πόνος τῇ χειρὶ οὐδὲ τῷ ποδὶ παρὰ φύσιν, μέχρις ἂν ποιῇ ὁ ποῦς τὰ τοῦ ποδὸς καὶ ἡ χεὶρ τὰ τῆς χειρός. οὕτως οὖν οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπῳ ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ παρὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ὁ πόνος, μέχρις ἂν ποιῇ τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· εἰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ κακόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ. Hard work is not unnatural to our hands and feet, as long as the foot does footwork while handiwork goes to the hand. In the same way, hard work is not unnatural to a human being, as long he is doing human work. If something isn't unnatural to a person, then it isn't bad for him.

Unamuno does not accept that God is rational. Reason cannot provide the kind of particular awareness or personality that strikes him as properly divine. Providing rational proofs of God just reduces divinity to impersonal concepts that cannot answer any real divine purpose. God, for Unamuno, offers ends, not explanations. A peace with our own life and death, perhaps, that has nothing to do with any precise mechanism for fixing them. El Dios del racionalismo deísta, en efecto, el Dios de las pruebas lógicas de su existencia, el ens realissimum y primer motor inmóvil, no es más que una Razón suprema, pero en el mismo sentido en que podemos llamar razón de la caída de los cuerpos a la ley de la gravitación universal, que es su explicación. Pero dirá alguien que esa que llamamos ley de la gravitación universal, u otra cualquiera ley o un principio matemático es una realidad propia e independiente, es un ángel, es algo que tiene conciencia de sí y de los demás, ¿qué es, persona? No, no e...

Lucilius complains to Seneca that he lacks books, so the older man promises to send some. He regrets that he hasn't been able to send himself, in person, but hopes to see Lucilius soon, when the latter's term in office as governor ( procurator ) of Sicily is over. Librorum istic inopiam esse quereris. Non refert quam multos sed quam bonos habeas: lectio certa prodest, varia delectat. Qui quo destinavit pervenire vult unam sequatur viam, non per multas vagetur: non ire istuc sed errare est. Vellem inquis magis consilium mihi quam libros dares . Ego vero quoscumque habeo mittere paratus sum et totum horreum excutere; me quoque isto, si possem, transferrem, et nisi mature te finem officii sperarem impetraturum, hanc senilem expeditionem indixissem mihi nec me Charybdis et Scylla et fabulosum istud fretum deterrere potuissent. Tranassem ista, non solum traiecissem, dummodo te complecti possem et praesens aestimare quantum animo crevisses. You complain that you lack books, in yo...

Marcus reflects on the power of human agency, which confronts past, present, and future, but can only make meaningful choices in the present. Ἐκ σωματίου εἰμὶ καὶ ψυχῆς. τῷ μὲν οὖν σωματίῳ πάντα ἀδιάφορα· οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναται διαφέρεσθαι. τῇ δὲ διανοίᾳ ἀδιάφορα ὅσα μή ἐστιν αὐτῆς ἐνεργήματα· ὅσα δέ γε αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἐνεργήματα, ταῦτα πάντα ἐπ’ αὐτῇ ἐστιν. καὶ τούτων μέντοι περὶ μόνον τὸ παρὸν πραγματεύεται· τὰ γὰρ μέλλοντα καὶ αρῳχηκότα ἐνεργήματα αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτὰ ἤδη ἀδιάφορα. I am made of soul, and this little body. For the body, all things are the same, as it is incapable of differentiating them on its own. Things remain undistinguished by my mind, too, as long as they fail to partake in its activities. Everything that manages to belong to the activity of my mind has meaning for it. Of all these things, the moments and events that achieve significance for me, only the present one actually matters. Future and past, while they do belong to my mind, are both alike in escaping my ability to dist...