Doubting the doubt of Descartes. Unamuno, Life 6.2
Unamuno
dismisses Cartesian skepticism as fake, constructed from doubts with
no real power because they are not actual doubts. From Unamuno's
perspective, the provisional morality Descartes allows himself in the Discourse on Method puts any authentic doubt beyond his reach.
Initium
sapientiae timor Domini, se dijo, queriendo acaso decir
timor mortis, o tal vez timor
vitae, que es lo mismo. Siempre resulta que el principio de
la sabiduría es un temor.
Y
este escepticismo salvador de que ahora voy a hablaros, ¿puede
decirse que sea la duda? Es la duda, sí, pero es mucho más que la
duda. La duda es con frecuencia una cosa muy fría, muy poco
vitalizadora, y, sobre todo, una cosa algo artificiosa, especialmente
desde que Descartes la rebajó al papel de método. El conflicto
entre la razón y la vida es algo más que una duda. Porque la duda
con facilidad se reduce a ser un elemento cómico.
La
duda metódica de Descartes es una duda cómica, una duda puramente
teórica, provisoria, es decir, la duda de uno que hace como que duda
sin dudar. Y porque era una duda de estufa, el hombre que concluyó
que existía de que pensaba, no aprobaba «esos humores turbulentos
(brouillons)
e inquietos que, no siendo llamados ni por su nacimiento ni por su
fortuna al manejo de los negocios públicos, no dejan de hacer
siempre en idea alguna nueva reforma», y se dolía de que pudiera
haber algo de esto en su escrito. No; él, Descartes, no se propuso
sino «reformar sus propios pensamientos y edificar sobre un cimiento
suyo propio». Y se propuso no recibir por verdadero nada que no
conociese evidentemente ser tal, y destruir todos los prejuicios e
ideas recibidas para construirse de nuevo su morada intelectual. Pero
«como no basta, antes de comenzar a reconstruir la casa en que se
mora, abatirla y hacer provisión de materiales y arquitectos, o
ejercitarse uno mismo en la arquitectura..., sino que es menester
haberse provisto de otra en que pueda uno alojarse cómodamente
mientras trabaja», se formó una moral provisional —une
morale de provision—, cuya primera ley era obedecer a
las costumbres de su país y retener constantemente la religión en
que Dios le hizo la gracia de que se hubiese instruído desde su
infancia, gobernándose en todo según las opiniones más moderadas.
Vamos, sí, una religión provisional, y hasta un Dios provisional. Y
escogía las opiniones más moderadas, por ser «las más cómodas
para la práctica». Pero más vale no seguir.
The
fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, 'twas said, meaning
perhaps the fear of death, or even the fear of life, which is
actually the same thing. In any case, the foundation for wisdom is
always fear.
Now
for the skepticism that arrives to save us from this fear: can we
call it doubt? It is doubt, certainly, but also much more than
that. Doubt is often a very cold thing, with little vital energy: it
is frequently artificial, especially since Descartes demoted it from
attitude to method. The conflict between reason and life is more than
any doubt can express, for doubt resolves easily into comedy.
The
methodical doubt of Descartes is comic doubt, a doubt purely
theoretical, provisional—the doubt of one who feigns insecurity
that he doesn't actually feel. Because his own doubt was so fake,
cooked up in a stove (†), the man who concluded that his thoughts
must be real did not approve of actual doubts: “These tempestuous
and anxious humors, summoned to guide public business neither by
birth nor by fortune, are always itching to craft some novel plan for
reformation” (Discourse on Method §2).
He was quite pained to think such humors might find place in his
writing. No! Descartes limited himself to proposing “the thorough
remaking of my own thoughts, which I shall reform and rebuild upon a
personal plan, unique to myself” (ibidem). That plan
proposed to receive nothing as true that was not self-evidently so,
and to destroy all prejudices and received ideas before making for
itself an intellectual dwellingplace. But “as it is not enough,
before beginning to rebuild the house we shall inhabit, to raze it
and arrange for materials and architects, or to study architecture
ourselves … but we must prepare another lodging to rent comfortably
while the work is done” (Discourse on Method §3),
so the philosopher made for himself a provisional morality. The
first law of this morality was obedience to the custom of his
country, followed close by adherence to the religion in which
God's grace had deigned to instruct him from childhood, as it had
been delivered to him by the most prudent judgments of others.
Indeed! A provisional religion, with a provisional God even! His
criterion for selecting the most prudent judgments was that they be
“most apt for practical application.” But this is already more
than enough Descartes for us—too much, even.
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