Life according to Nature. Marcus Aurelius 5.6

Marcus Aurelius reflects on the historical fact that human action occurs without perfect understanding. There is no such thing, for him, as knowing all possible consequences of any action. This means that he must evaluate actions with criteria that are never going to be strictly consequentialist or utilitarian. He is immune to the seductive appeal of rational arguments from self-evidence. The world of human action, for him, is led by willful persuasion rather than rational conviction, and its drivers are beyond human control. This does not make reason useless, or agents utterly unfree, in his view. There is room for reason and choice in the realm of human and animal action, but this room is not unlimited or unbounded. It is contained by nature, whose laws are above and beyond our power. Every action in nature is greater than any sum of its parts.

Ὁ μέν τίς ἐστιν, ὅταν τι δεξιὸν περί τινα πράξῃ, πρόχειρος καὶ λογίσασθαι αὐτῷ τὴν χάριν. ὁ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοῦτο οὐ πρόχειρος, ἀλλὰ μέντοι παρ’ ἑαυτῷ ὡς περὶ χρεώστου διανοεῖται καὶ οἶδεν ὃ πεποίηκεν. ὁ δέ τις τρόπον τινὰ οὐδὲ οἶδεν ὃ πεποίηκεν, ἀλλὰ ὅμοιός ἐστιν ἀμπέλῳ βότρυν ἐνεγκούσῃ καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο προσεπιζητούσῃ μετὰ τὸ ἅπαξ τὸν ἴδιον καρπὸν ἐνηνοχέναι. ἵππος δραμών, κύων ἰχνεύσας, μέλισσα μέλι ποιήσασα, ἄνθρωπος δ’ εὖ ποιήσας οὐκ ἐπίσταται, ἀλλὰ μεταβαίνει ἐφ’ ἕτερον, ὡς ἄμπελος ἐπὶ τὸ πάλιν ἐν τῇ ὥρᾳ τὸν βότρυν ἐνεγκεῖν. ἐν τούτοις οὖν δεῖ εἶναι τοῖς τρόπον τινὰ ἀπαρακολουθήτως αὐτὸ ποιοῦσι. «ναί· ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δεῖ παρακολουθεῖν· ἴδιον γάρ,» φησί, «τοῦ κοινωνικοῦ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι κοινωνικῶς ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ νὴ Δία βούλεσθαι καὶ τὸν κοινωνὸν αἰσθέσθαι.» ἀληθὲς μέν ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις, τὸ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενον παρεκδέχῃ· διὰ τοῦτο ἔσῃ εἷς ἐκείνων ὧν πρότερον ἐπεμνήσθην· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι λογικῇ τινι πιθανότητι παράγονται. ἐὰν δὲ θελήσῃς συνεῖναι τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον, μὴ φοβοῦ, μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο παραλίπῃς τι ἔργον κοινωνικόν.

A man who does something kind for his fellow is ready also to show him favor. But the beneficiary is not prepared for this: he thinks of himself as a debtor, remaining aware of what was done for him. The first man, meanwhile, has no more regard for his deed, being like unto a grapevine that seeks nothing after it has borne its cluster. As the horse that has finished a race, or the dog whose hunt is over, or the bee whose honey is made, so the man who has completed a good action does not understand what he has done. He moves on to the next thing, even as the vine bears another cluster when its season returns. In all these deeds there must dwell some way or method beyond the grasp of the doers. “Yea, verily! But still they must follow this method consciously,” someone says. “For each has personal insight into the world he engages, willing and witnessing his relationship to it, by Zeus!” You speak the truth, friend, but now you must also receive it back, in the words just uttered. By conscious commitment you will become another of those agents I just mentioned, driven and compelled by some logical plausibility or persuasion larger than any single intention. Don't shrink from this saying in fear, if you are willing to understand it, lest thereby you lose your chance to take part in some shared endeavor.