Credo quia absurdum, quia consolans. Unamuno, Life 5.15
Reason
will examine and analyze all our problems without limiting herself.
She is not bound by our desire (for good, or for ill: her blade cuts
both ways, with two edges). Desire may lead us to bind things not
rationally bound (like truth and happiness).
A
este estado de ánimo en que se supone, más o menos a conciencia,
que tenemos que conocer una solución, acompaña aquello de las
funestas consecuencias. Coged cualquier libro apologético, es decir,
de teología abogadesca, y veréis con qué frecuencia os encontráis
con epígrafes que dicen: «Funestas consecuencias de esta doctrina».
Y las consecuencias funestas de una doctrina probarán, a lo sumo,
que esta doctrina es funesta, pero no que es falsa, porque falta
probar que lo verdadero sea lo que más nos conviene. La
identificación de la verdad y el bien no es más que un piadoso
deseo. A. Vinet (†),
en sus Études
sur Blaise Pascal,
dice:
«De las dos necesidades que trabajan sin cesar a la naturaleza
humana, la de la felicidad no es sólo la más universalmente sentida
y más constantemente experimentada, sino que es también la más
imperiosa. Y esta necesidad no es sólo sensitiva; es intelectual. No
sólo para el alma,
sino
también para el
espíritu,
es una necesidad la dicha. La dicha forma parte de la verdad». Esta
proposición última—le
bonheur fait partie de la vérité—es
una proposición profundamente abogadesca, pero no científica ni de
razón pura. Mejor sería decir que la verdad forma parte de la dicha
en un sentido tertulianesco, de credo
quia absurdum,
que en rigor quiere decir: credo
quia consolans,
creo porque es cosa que me consuela.
The
state of mind that assumes our understanding as a matter of course,
positing that we must know how to solve any problem posed, is
followed closely by an awareness of terrible consequences. Take any
apologetic book you like, any book that presents theology from the
perspective of a legal casuist, and you will see how often you
encounter subheadings that spell doom: “Terrible consequences of
this doctrine.” The terrible consequences of a doctrine will prove,
in the end, that the doctrine is terrible, but not that it is false,
because the casuists always omit to prove that truth is that which
best suits our desires. The identification of truth and goodness is
no more than a pious desire. Alexandre Vinet, in his Studies on
Blaise Pascal, says, “Of the
two needs that constrain human nature constantly, the need for
happiness is not merely the most felt and the most noticed: it is
also the most demanding. This need is not just sentimental; it is
intellectual. A sense of blessed
joyfulness is necessary for the spirit, as for the soul. Blessed joy
is part of truth” (‡).
The final observation, that happiness is part of truth, belongs
entirely to the realm of law: it has nothing to do with science or
pure reason. It would be better, from a strictly rational
perspective, to say that truth is only part of happiness in the sense
preached by Tertullian, whose credo quia absurdum (“I
believe because faith is absurd”) actually expresses something
else: credo quia consolans (“I
believe because faith consoles me”).
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(†)
Alexandre Rodolphe Vinet (1797-1847 CE) was a Swiss schoolteacher who
became an academic theologian, and a privat-docent at the University
of Basel. He published many books.
(‡)
In his original publication,
Unamuno notes that he
is tempted to render the French esprit in
this passage with inteligencia (intelligence,
awareness) rather than espíritu (spirit,
inspiration). He prefers dicha (blessed
joy, blessed joyfulness) to felicidad (happiness,
good fortune) as
a rendering of bonheur,
and finds necesidad (need,
necessity) wanting as a substitute for besoin,
though he offers no better alternative.