Life resists rational understanding. Unamuno, Life 5.8

A problem with words, historically: they are used to mark events, to describe observation. Not all observations are reducible to rational abstraction that parses them all equally, delimiting them according to some universal plan that can be rendered explicit. A descriptive grammar is not the same as a prescriptive one, and a collection of descriptions is no exhaustive index of prescription. Having a term for something is not the same as knowing that that something exists in any actual, definitive form outside our language (subject to our direct control or manipulation, as words are).


Jorge Berkeley, obispo anglicano de Cloyne y hermano en espíritu del también obispo anglicano José Butler, quería salvar como éste la fe en la inmortalidad del alma. Desde las primeras palabras del Prefacio de su Tratado referente a los principios del conocimiento humano (A treatise concerning the Principles of human Knowledge), nos dice que este su tratado le parece útil, especialmente para los tocados de escepticismo o que necesitan una demostración de la existencia e inmaterialidad de Dios y de la inmortalidad natural del alma. En el capítulo CXL establece que tenemos una idea o más bien noción del espíritu, conociendo otros espíritus por medio de los nuestros, de lo cual afirma redondamente, en el párrafo siguiente, que se sigue la natural inmortalidad del alma. Y aquí entra en una serie de confusiones basadas en la ambigüedad que al término noción da. Y es después de haber establecido casi como per saltum la inmortalidad del alma, porque ésta no es pasiva, como los cuerpos, cuando pasa en el capítulo CXLVII a decirnos que la existencia de Dios es más evidente que la del hombre. ¡Y decir que hay quien, a pesar de esto, duda de ella!

Complicábase la cuestión porque se hacía de la conciencia una propiedad del alma, que era algo más que ella, es decir, una forma sustancial del cuerpo, originadora de las funciones orgánicas todas de éste. El alma no sólo piensa, siente y quiere, sino mueve al cuerpo y origina sus funciones vitales; en el alma humana se unen las funciones vegetativa, animal y racional. Tal es la doctrina. Pero el alma separada del cuerpo no puede tener ya funciones vegetativas y animales.

Para la razón, en fin, un conjunto de verdaderas confusiones.


George Berkeley (†), Anglican bishop of Cloyne and brother in spirit of fellow bishop Joseph Butler, wished like Butler to save faith in the soul's immortality. The first words of the preface to his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge make this intention clear, informing us of his opinion that this treatise will be especially useful to those tinged with skepticism, or to any who might need a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God, and of the natural immortality of the soul. In chapter 140 he explains that we have an idea, or perhaps better a notion, of spirit that knows other spirits by recourse to its knowledge of itself. From this he proceeds in the next paragraph to deduce, in circular fashion, the consequence that the soul is naturally immortal. He then enters upon a series of confused observations founded on the ambiguity of the term notion, and having established the immortality of the soul almost by naked assertionleaping to it from the fact that the soul is not passive, like the bodyhe goes on to tell us in chapter 147 that the existence of God is more evident than that of man. And yet somehow, he finds, in spite of this, people doubt it!

The question is historically complicated by the fact that consciousness is typically conceived as a property of the soul, which latter extends itself beyond the realm of thought to become a substantial form of the body, a material point of origin for all the latter's organic functions. The ancient soul does not merely think, feel, and desire: it moves the body and gives birth to all vital processes. In the human soul, the ancients find vegetable, animal, and rational processes united together. Such is their doctrine. But once separated from the body, the soul cannot anymore contain vegetable and animal processes.

In short, the concept of soul is rationally inscrutable, invoking a conjunction of things whose mutual relationship is truly confused, and confusing, when we consider them rationally.


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(†) Born in Dysart castle in Ireland, George Berkeley (1685-1753) grew up there and attended Trinity College in Dublin, where he took two degrees and taught Greek before making the Grand Tour, taking holy orders in the Church of Ireland, and traveling to Rhode Island (where he settled for a time in Middletown with his newlywed wife, Anne Forster). When his plans to found a college in Bermuda came to naught, owing to lack of parliamentary funding, he returned to London, then to Cloyne (where he was bishop from 1734), and finally, after retirement, to Oxford, where he died. He is most remembered for his theory of immaterialism, which propounded that our material world is actually composed of immaterial perception (hence the Latin phrase quoted by Unamuno to sum him up: esse est percipi).