Substance persists beyond accident. Unamuno, Life 5.3
We
observe that our bodies have integrity extending beyond momentary
expressions of material coherence. This observation becomes grounds
for believing in our immortality (despite that belief being without
compelling rational foundation). It is also grounds for noticing that
the world has other things that persist and exist beyond any moment
limited by our faculties for observation.
William
James, en la tercera de las conferencias que dedicó al pragmatismo
en el Lowell Institute de Boston, en Diciembre de 1906 y Enero de
1907 (Pragmatism,
a new name for some old ways of thinking,
publicado en 1907), y que es lo más débil de toda la obra del
insigne pensador norteamericano —algo excesivamente débil—, dice
así: «El escolasticismo ha tomado la noción de sustancia del
sentido común, haciéndola técnica y articulada. Pocas cosas
parecerían tener menos consecuencias pragmáticas para nosotros que
las sustancias, privados como estamos de todo contacto con ellas.
Pero hay un caso en que el escolasticismo ha probado la importancia
de la sustancia-idea tratándola pragmáticamente. Me refiero a
ciertas disputas concernientes al misterio de la Eucaristía. La
sustancia aparecería aquí con un gran valor pragmático. Desde que
los accidentes de la hostia no cambian en la consagración y se ha
convertido ella, sin embargo, en el cuerpo de Cristo, el cambio no
puede ser más que de la sustancia. La sustancia del pan tiene que
haberse retirado, sustituyéndola milagrosamente la divina sustancia
sin alterarse las propiedades sensibles inmediatas. Pero aun cuando
éstas no se alteran, ha tenido lugar una tremenda diferencia; no
menos sino el que nosotros, los que recibimos el sacramento, nos
alimentamos ahora de la sustancia misma de la divinidad. La noción
de sustancia irrumpe, pues, en la vida con terrible efecto si admitís
que las sustancias pueden separarse de sus accidentes y cambiar estos
últimos. Y es esta la única aplicación pragmática de la idea de
sustancia de que tenga yo conocimiento, y es obvio que sólo puede
ser tratada en serio por los que creen en la
presencia
real por
fundamentos independientes.»
Ahora
bien; dejando de lado la cuestión de si en buena teología, y no
digo en buena razón, porque todo esto cae fuera de ella, se puede
confundir la sustancia del cuerpo —del cuerpo, no del alma— de
Cristo con la sustancia misma de la divinidad, es decir, con Dios
mismo, parece imposible que un tan ardiente anhelador de la
inmortalidad del alma, un hombre como W. James, cuya filosofía toda
no tiende sino a establecer racionalmente esa creencia, no hubiera
echado de ver que la aplicación pragmática del concepto de
sustancia a la doctrina de la transustanciación eucarística no es
sino una consecuencia de su aplicación anterior a la doctrina de la
inmortalidad del alma. Como en el anterior capítulo expuse, el
sacramento de la eucaristía no es sino el reflejo de la creencia en
la inmortalidad; es, para el creyente, la prueba experimental mística
de que es inmortal el alma y gozará eternamente de Dios. Y el
concepto de sustancia nació, ante todo y sobre todo, del concepto de
la sustancialidad del alma, y se afirmó éste para apoyar la fe en
su persistencia después de separada del cuerpo. Tal es su primera
aplicación pragmática y con ella su origen. Y luego hemos
trasladado ese concepto a las cosas de fuera. Por sentirme sustancia,
es decir, permanente en medio de mis cambios, es por lo que atribuyo
sustancialidad a los agentes que fuera de mí, en medio de sus
cambios, permanecen. Del mismo modo que el concepto de fuerza, en
cuanto distinto del movimiento, nace de mi sensación de esfuerzo
personal al poner en movimiento algo.
In
the third conference dedicated to pragmatism at the Lowell Institute
of Boston in December of 1906 and January of 1907 (published as
Pragmatism in 1907), William
James produced the weakest thought in all his career, which despite
its distinction never achieved anything strong
(†).
Quoth he: "Scholastic philosophy took the common-sense notion of
substance and made it technical, articulate. Few things would appear
to have less consequence for us pragmatists than substances, seeing
as we lack all contact with them. But there is one instance in which
scholasticism has shown the importance of substance qua idea by
treating it pragmatically. I am referring to certain arguments about
the mystery of the Eucharist. Substance here would appear to have
great pragmatic value. As the
accidents that befall the host during its consecration affect no
material change in it, and yet it somehow becomes the body of Christ,
the only thing that can have changed is its substance. The substance
of ordinary bread must have withdrawn, being replaced in miraculous
fashion by divine substance that offers no immediately sensible
indication of this change. But though its manifestation remains the
same, nevertheless we who take the sacrament observe this great
difference, that in partaking of it we feast upon the very substance
of divinity. Here we see, then, that the notion of substance can
invade ordinary life with powerful effect, if you grant that
substances can be separated from material accidents and can change
them. This is the only pragmatic application of the notion of
substance of which I am aware, and it is obvious that it can only be
taken seriously by those whose belief in reality rests on a
foundation that excludes material accidents."
Well
then! Leaving reason aside,
as these matters have nothing to do with her, I will also pass over
the question whether good theology will allow us to identify the
substance of Christ's body—not his soul, mind you!—with the
very substance of divinity, i.e.
with God himself. Setting all this aside, I find it impossible to
believe that such an ardent admirer of the soul's immortality as
James, whose entire
philosophy tends to provide a rational footing for our belief in it,
would have failed to notice that the pragmatic application of
substance to the
doctrine of transubstantiation in the Eucharist is just a consequence
of its prior application to the doctrine of the immortality of the
soul. As I explained in the chapter before this one, the sacrament of
the Eucharist is simply a symbol or signal of belief in immortality.
For the believer, it constitutes
mystical proof of personal immortality, illustrating that the soul is
immortal and that it shall rejoice forever in God. The concept of
substance was born, originally and ultimately, from the concept of
the soul's substantiality,
and the affirmation of substance serves to sustain faith in the
soul's persistence after it has been separated from the body. This is
the first pragmatic application of this concept, and also its origin.
Other applications to different things come later. To clarify: it is
only after I have felt myself to be substantial, i.e. permanent in
the midst of my alterations and evolutions, that I attribute
substantiality to agents outside myself, agents who like me remain
permanent in the midst of their evolutions. In
the same way my concept of
force, as distinct from movement, arises from noticing the personal
exertion I make to put something in motion.
---
(†)
William James (1842-1910 CE) was born into a wealthy American family
and became one of the foremost philosophers of his
era. His grandfather
emigrated from Ireland and made a fortune doing business in New York,
where William's father Henry studied to enter the ministry, a career
that led him ultimately to become a follower of Emmanuel Swedenborg.
William studied medicine at Harvard, but never practiced, preferring
to teach and write. His subjects
included physiology, psychology, and philosophy, which he sought to
reconcile in a collection of doctrines known as pragmatism.
This approach, which he shared with
others like John Dewey and
Charles Sanders Pierce, conceived thought
and concept as the instruments of action.