Friendship or Utility? Pick one. Seneca, Epistles 1.9.8-12
Seneca
explains his take on friendship. It is something we do for its own
sake, not for benefits that can be separated from it. A real friend
is there for you in times of trouble as well as times of joy, and you
return the favor gladly, reflexively, without calculation. There is
no friendship without liability. <Latin>.
Nunc
ad propositum revertamur. Sapiens etiam si contentus est se, tamen
habere amicum vult, si nihil aliud, ut exerceat amicitiam, ne tam
magna virtus iaceat, non ad hoc quod dicebat Epicurus in hac ipsa
epistula,
ut habeat qui sibi aegro assideat, succurrat in vincula coniecto vel
inopi, sed
ut habeat aliquem cui ipse aegro assideat, quem ipse circumventum
hostili custodia liberet. Qui se spectat et propter hoc ad amicitiam
venit male cogitat. Quemadmodum coepit, sic desinet: paravit amicum
adversum vincla laturum opem; cum primum crepuerit catena, discedet.
Hae sunt amicitiae quas temporarias populus appellat; qui utilitatis
causa assumptus est tamdiu placebit quamdiu utilis fuerit. Hac re
florentes amicorum turba circumsedet, circa eversos solitudo est, et
inde amici fugiunt ubi probantur; hac re ista tot nefaria exempla
sunt aliorum metu relinquentium, aliorum metu prodentium.
Necesse
est initia inter se et exitus congruant: qui amicus esse coepit quia
expedit et desinet quia expedit
(⁑);
placebit
aliquod pretium contra amicitiam, si ullum in illa placet praeter
ipsam.
In
quid amicum paras? Ut
habeam pro quo mori possim, ut habeam quem in exsilium sequar, cuius
me morti et opponam et impendam: ista quam tu describis negotiatio
est, non amicitia, quae ad commodum accedit, quae quid consecutura
sit spectat.
Non
dubie habet aliquid simile amicitiae affectus amantium; possis dicere
illam esse insanam amicitiam. Numquid ergo quisquam amat lucri causa?
numquid ambitionis aut gloriae? Ipse per se amor, omnium aliarum
rerum neglegens, animos in cupiditatem formae non sine spe mutuae
caritatis accendit.
Quid
ergo? ex honestiore causa coit turpis affectus?
Non
agitur inquis
nunc de hoc, an amicitia propter se ipsam appetenda sit. Immo
vero nihil magis probandum est; nam si propter se ipsam expetenda
est, potest ad illam accedere qui se ipso contentus est.
Quomodo ergo ad illam accedit? Quomodo
ad rem pulcherrimam, non lucro captus nec varietate fortunae
perterritus; detrahit amicitiae maiestatem suam qui illam parat ad
bonos casus.
But
let us return now to the matter at hand. Even though the sage is
content with himself, nevertheless he desires a friend, if only for
the purpose of expressing friendship, a virtue so great that it
should not lie idle. He will not value friendship for the reason
Epicurus discusses in the epistle: "in order that he may acquire
someone to look after him, saving him from the chains of obligation
or poverty." Instead, he will desire to look after another,
someone whom he is in a position to relieve from hostile
encirclement. The person who looks at himself and seeks friendship
for his own interest is planning poorly. As he has begun, so will he
end: since he has made friendship a tool for avoiding chains of
obligation, he will bolt the moment he hears a chain rattling. These
are the friendships folk call temporary, undertaken for the sake of
utility and pleasant only as long as they remain useful. This is why
a crowd of friends will besiege those blooming with
good
fortune, while everyone avoids people
already wrecked. The moment these friends are put to the test, they
flee. History shows many disgusting examples: some flee in fear of
losing what they use, others in fear of being useful themselves. Of
necessity, their entrance into friendship resembles their exit: the
person who becomes a friend for profit will abandon friendship for
the same reason. Any price can purchase friendship whose purpose is
not
friendly.
"Why
do you make friends?" To have someone I could die for. Someone I
would follow into exile. Someone whose death I would resist to the
bitter end, counting it equal to my own. What you are describing is
not friendship, but a negotiation:
a deal which looks
for favorable terms and outcomes.
Friendship
definitely carries something similar to the mutual affection between
lovers. You could say, in fact, that romantic love is a kind of
insane friendship. For
what person ever fell in love because it was profitable? Who would do
something so disastrous inspired by ambition, or glory? All by
himself, utterly negligent of every other thing, Love drives minds
wild with desire for Beauty,
so that they suppose she might
return their affections.
What to make of this? Does any disgraceful affect arise from origins
more honest?
"We
are not deciding now," you say, "whether friendship is
something to seek out for its own sake." But there is nothing
more pertinent to our discussion than this very question, since if
friendship is
in fact something we must seek for its own sake, then the person
content with himself can nevertheless go after it. "How would he
do this?" The way he
approaches
anything
exceedingly beautiful: without external
motivation, utterly free from any thought of profit or fear of fickle
fortune.
He
would betray the divine majesty of friendship if he made her subject
to convenience.
---
(⁑)
I accept et
desinet quia expedit from
Haase.