Teach yourself, and let the world learn. Seneca, Epistles 1.7.6-9
A
serious problem with politics is the tendency it carries to make us
view others as means, when we want power ourselves, or as masters,
when we worship it in them. Seneca encourages Lucilius to avoid the
temptation to give way to either of these drives. Don't seek to fight
the crowd, as someone who would be its master, or to get lost in it,
replacing your personal ethics and values with whatever it happens to
like at the moment. Teach yourself and learn from folk you know
personally; don't get sucked into the game of lecturing strangers.
You can hear the Latin <here>.
Subducendus
populo est tener animus et parum tenax recti: facile transitur ad
plures. Socrati et Catoni et Laelio excutere morem suum dissimilis
multitudo potuisset: adeo nemo nostrum, qui cum maxime
concinnamus ingenium, ferre impetum vitiorum tam magno comitatu
venientium potest. Unum exemplum luxuriae aut avaritiae multum
mali facit: convictor delicatus paulatim enervat et mollit, vicinus
dives cupiditatem irritat, malignus comes quamvis candido et simplici
rubiginem suam affricuit: quid tu accidere his moribus credis in quos
publice factus est impetus? Necesse est aut imiteris aut oderis.
Utrumque autem devitandum est: neve similis malis fias, quia multi
sunt, neve inimicus multis, quia dissimiles sunt. Recede in te ipse
quantum potes; cum his versare qui te meliorem facturi sunt, illos
admitte quos tu potes facere meliores. Mutuo ista fiunt, et homines
dum docent discunt. Non est quod te gloria publicandi ingenii
producat in medium, ut recitare istis velis aut disputare; quod
facere te vellem, si haberes isti populo idoneam mercem: nemo est qui
intellegere te possit. Aliquis fortasse, unus aut alter incidet, et
hic ipse formandus tibi erit instituendusque ad intellectum tui. Cui
ergo ista didici? Non est quod timeas ne operam perdideris,
si tibi didicisti.
A
youthful mind must yield to the crowd; its hold on what is right is
insufficiently developed to resist, and it is easily drawn away from
its own train of thought to that of the majority. It is not difficult
to imagine the crowd offering Socrates, Cato, and Laelius (†) a
different excuse for its conduct than history shows: “None of us,”
it might say, “was capable of bearing the onslaught of such a great
company of vices, for all our praise of individual character.” Even
single examples of extravagance or avarice cause much mischief. A
charming comrade weakens your resolve against excess little by
little, softening it constantly over time. A rich neighbor stirs your
greed. A malicious friend smears rust on every clean, simple mind he
meets. What do you think happens when you encounter such manners en
masse? You must either imitate them, or hate them. Both options are
bad: you should not imitate what is wrong, merely because many people
do; nor should you become an enemy of the people because they are
unlike you. Retreat into yourself as much as you can. Spend your time
and energy with those who are going to make you better; invite some
whom you are capable of assisting, yourself. There is reciprocity
here: people teach as they are learning. I do not mean that you
should publish your genius openly to the crowd, drawn by glory—that
you should seek to lecture them or dispute with them. Even if you had
precisely what they need, I would not want you to do anything: nobody
would understand it. One person perhaps, maybe two or three, would
get it, and these would be folk to work with, to introduce into the
sanctuary of your mind. “For whom then did I learn these things?”
you ask. There is no reason to fear that you have wasted your time,
if you learned them only for yourself.
---
(†)
Three famous individuals who refused to alter their judgments in the
face of popular disapproval. Socrates was put to death by the
Athenians in 399 BCE on the grounds that his unorthodox approach to
religion corrupted the youth. He could have chosen voluntary exile
and remained alive, but he preferred to drink hemlock and die (see
Plato, Apology; Xenophon, Memorabilia).
Despite large street protests calling for the repeal of the Oppian
Law in Rome, Cato the Elder refused to change his position that it
should stand. The law, which forbade married Roman women from wearing
certain jewelry in public, was eventually overturned (in 195 BCE),
but Cato retained his position as one of the most respected
magistrates in the city (see Livy 34.1-8). Gaius Laelius Sapiens is best remembered today for his friendship with Scipio Aemilianus and
the impression he left on Cicero, who made him a character in several
philosophical dialogues—including one On Friendship, in
which he discusses how hard it is for anyone in politics to have true
friends. The will-to-power tempts politicians to acquire and discard
friends with an eye toward taking and consolidating their public
authority, not fostering trust or humanity (see especially chapter
17, §§ 62-65). Some politicians court power by promising
to use it to give the people what they want: Cicero has Laelius
explicitly mention an instance when both he and Scipio vocally
opposed a popular law proposed by Gaius Papirius Carbo (in 131 BCE),
who wanted to abolish term-limits for tribunes (25, § 96).